Mardel Zuniga v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-11-2019 
Mardel Zuniga v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Mardel Zuniga v. Attorney General United States" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 568. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/568 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 18-2350 
_________________ 
 
MARDEL ZUNIGA, 
 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
      Respondent 
 
_________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A205-129-094) 
Immigration Judge: Anne S. Garcy 
_________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, BIBAS, FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Opinion Filed:  July 11, 2019) 
 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION** 
_________________ 
 
                                                 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Mardel Zuniga, a native of Belize, has attempted to reopen her removal 
proceedings on the grounds that she suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel.  She 
argues that she is eligible for cancellation of removal, but her former attorney failed to 
attach necessary and available documents supporting her claim.  Tragically, this error has 
repeated itself.  As stated in more detail below, Zuniga has failed to meet the procedural 
requirements necessary to make out a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Bound 
by our precedents, we cannot overlook them, regardless of the overall merits of Zuniga’s 
claim.  We must therefore deny her petition for review.     
I.  
 Zuniga came to this country as a minor on a temporary visa, which she subsequently 
overstayed.  Immigrations and Customs Enforcement arrested her in 2012 and placed her 
into removal proceedings.  After a number of continuances during which she attempted to 
retain counsel, Zuniga appeared in immigration court in September 2013 pro se, prepared 
to provide documents to the immigration judge that showed she was eligible for 
cancellation of removal.   Unfortunately, because of a personal emergency, the immigration 
judge cancelled that hearing.  The immigration court rescheduled the hearing for August 
2015, a delay of almost two years.  Zuniga did not appear at that rescheduled hearing; she 
alleges that she did not receive notice of the hearing date.  The immigration judge ordered 
her removed in absentia, concluding that she had abandoned her application for 
cancellation of removal.  The court entered the final order of removal on October 9, 2015.     
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In March 2016, Zuniga, then represented by counsel, moved to reopen her 
proceedings.  A month later, the immigration judge denied this motion on the grounds that 
she failed to attach documentation or evidence in support of her motion.   
Zuniga did not appeal that ruling but filed a second motion to reopen with new 
counsel—her current counsel—in November 2017.  With this second motion to reopen, 
Zuniga attached the relevant documentation for her application for cancellation of removal, 
and produced affidavits supporting her argument that she had acted diligently in trying to 
ascertain her correct hearing date.  She also argued that her previous attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance.   
The immigration judge construed this second motion in two ways: (1) as a motion 
to reconsider its denial of the first and (2) as a second motion to reopen. The immigration 
judge found that the motion was untimely as a motion to reconsider. And she found that 
regulations did not allow Zuniga to file more than one motion to reopen. Lastly, the 
immigration judge found that her ineffective-assistance claim could not overcome these 
defects because Zuniga had not followed the procedural requirements for making such 
claims.  Zuniga appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which 
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.   Zuniga petitions us for review now.1         
                                                 
1 The Court has jurisdiction over Zuniga’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1). 
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II.  
 The Board’s decision to deny a motion to reopen is reviewed “under a highly 
deferential abuse of discretion standard.”2  The Court will disturb that decision only if it is 
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”3  Agency regulations allow a petitioner to file one 
motion to reopen proceedings, and one motion to reconsider.4  Additional motions are 
barred.  Further, a petitioner must file any motion to reconsider within thirty days of the 
decision.5   
 The Board affirmed the immigration judge in denying Zuniga’s second petition on 
three grounds:  (1) it was time-barred, to the extent it was a motion to reconsider Zuniga’s 
first motion to reopen; (2) it was number-barred, to the extent it was a second petition to 
reopen; and (3) Zuniga failed to adequately plead ineffective assistance of counsel.   
 By the plain language of the regulatory bars, Zuniga’s petition is precluded 
regardless of whether her motion was a motion to reconsider or a second motion to reopen.  
Zuniga filed her first motion to reopen in March 2016—the only motion to reopen 
permitted by regulation.  The immigration judge ruled on that motion in April 2016, and 
Zuniga did not file her second motion until well over a year later—long after the 30-day 
deadline to file a motion to reconsider.   
                                                 
2 Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2011). 
3 Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).   
4 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (“Subject to the exceptions in this paragraph and paragraph 
(b)(4), a party may file only one motion to reconsider and one motion to reopen 
proceedings.”). 
5 Id. (“A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a final 
administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion . . . .”). 
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But the time period for filing motions to reconsider is subject to equitable tolling.6  
“Ineffective assistance of counsel can serve as a basis for equitable tolling if substantiated 
and accompanied by a showing of due diligence.”7  So Zuniga could arguably overcome 
the time and number bars if she showed ineffective assistance of counsel.8 
 Unfortunately, she has not.  The requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel 
are laid out in the Board’s decision in Matter of Lozada.9  Our Circuit has “essentially 
adopted the procedural requirements that the [Board] developed for ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims.”10  These claims have both a procedural and substantive components.11  
Procedurally, “the allegedly aggrieved person must (1) provide an affidavit attesting to the 
relevant facts, (2) inform former counsel of the allegations and allow him an opportunity 
to respond, and (3) ‘if it is asserted that prior counsel’s handling of the case involved a 
violation of ethical or legal responsibilities, the motion should reflect whether a complaint 
has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and 
if not, why not.’”12   
                                                 
6 Cf. Alzaarir, 639 F.3d at 90 (holding that equitable tolling applies to the time limit for 
motions to reopen).  Equitable tolling may also apply to the numerical limit on motions to 
reopen.  We need not decide the issue, since we find that Zuniga has not met the 
requirements to show ineffective assistance of counsel.  
7 Id. 
8 Zuniga notes this possibility in her brief.  Pet’r Br. at 11.  She does not otherwise 
contest the fact that her second motion would be time-barred or number-barred.  Because 
we otherwise deny Zuniga’s petition on the merits, we need not also consider whether she 
has waived any arguments in this regard.   
9 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988).   
10 Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2008). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. (quoting Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639). 
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 Zuniga has not attempted to show she has met any of those requirements.  Even on 
appeal, knowing that the immigration judge ruled that she had failed to meet Lozada’s 
requirements, she spends no time discussing them, or citing Circuit precedent applying 
them.  Zuniga has failed to follow the procedural requirements necessary to plead 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and has made no effort to explain why.  Whatever the 
substantive merit of her petition, the Court must deny her claim. 
 Because she has not adequately pled ineffective assistance of counsel, Zuniga 
cannot apply equitable tolling to her second motion.  It is therefore barred.  
III.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Zuniga’s petition for review. 
